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UTAH SUPREMEfeRTONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
R RIF F ^ Professional Law Corporation 
mm*** ^nULUJ-™ F I L E D 
OCT 1 5 1991 
CLERK SUPREME COURT 
October 15
 r 1991 yj/^ H 
HAND DELIVERED 
Geoffrey J. Butler 
Clerk, Utah Supreme Court 
332 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Re: Board of Equalization of Salt Lake County v. Utah 
State Tax Commission, ex rel Judd, Case No. 
91-0256 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
Pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Respondents Judd submit the case of Salt Lake County 
v. State Tax Commission, 170 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (Sept. 30, 1991) 
as supplemental authority for the argument set forth at pages 
14-17 of the Brief of Respondents Judd. Respondents believe that 
this case, a copy of which is attached hereto, is relevant to 
their argument that their property was properly found to be 
subject to assessment under the Farmland Assessment Act. 
Sincerely, 
& 
ik C. Attwood 
JCA:jdg 
Enclosure 
cc: Bill Thomas Peters, Esq. 
Lee A. Dever, Esq. 
ONE UTAH CENTER • 201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 • Post Office Box 11898 • Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 • Telephone 801-532-1234 • Facsimile 801-536-6111 
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SALT LAKE COLNTY e\ rel. Count* Board 




STATE TAX COMMISSION of Itah e\ rel. 
Bell Mountain Corporation, 
Respondent. 
No. 880447 
FILED: September 30, 1991 
Original Proceeding in This Court 
ATTORNEYS: 
David £. Yocum, Karl L Hendnckson, Bill 
Thomas Peters, Salt Lake Citv, for Salt 
Lake Count) 
R. Paul Van Dam, Bryce H Pettev, Salt Lake 
City, for State Tax Commission 
Clark Waddoups, Roger D Hennksen, for 
Bell Mountain Corporation 
This opinion is subject to roision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice: 
This case is before us on a writ of review to 
the Utah State Tax Commission. §alt Lake 
County seeks review of a decision of the 
Commission that seven contiguous parcels ef 
vacant land totalling approximately 431.41 
acres in Salt Lake County qualified for asse-
ssment under the Farmland Assessment Act of 
1969 (F A.A.), Utah Code Ann. §§59-5-
86 to-105 (1986).1 Bell Mountain Corpora-
tion is the owner of the parcels of land, which 
he on the foothills of the NKa^ atch Mountains 
adjacent to an exclusive residential area which 
Beil Mountain has developed and continues to* 
develop gradually on its terfd. For the years 
1983, 1984, and 1985, Salt Lake County ass-
essed the parcels as farmland. In 1986, the 
County denied F.A.A. status for the property; 
assessed it at market value, and applied the 
rollback tax. Bell Mountain appealed to the 
Commission. The Commission, in an informal 
hearing, decided that the Count) 's assessment 
was proper Pursuant to Bell Mountain's 
request for a rehearing, the Commission ren-
dered a formal decision reinstating the seven 
parcels to F A . \ status The Commission 
lound that, for the 1986 tax vear, the cattle 
that pastured on the propertv were sold for 
$2,413 99 Although one dissenting commiss-
ioner felt that the statutorv requirement 
'activeh devoted to aencultural use" was not 
I T X H \ D \ \ N C L RLPORTS 
met by Bell Mountain, the Commission con- j 
eluded that Bell Mountain met the preference j 
criteria of section 59-5-8"" in that the pro- ' 
pertv exceeded five acre^. produced an annual 
gross .Rcome n exce^ of $1.0(0 per vear from 
agricultural jse. and had *etn in agricultural 
use for :he :-AO ;mmed'jt,!v preceding vears. 
Our Ntandard of rev.ew :S governed !^ v the 
Liah \c1mmistranve Procedures Act. Lrah 
Code Ann §6? 46b:2 i.l9$9), nasmuch 
as all agencv adjudicative proceedings here 
under review were commenced after January 
1. 1988. Under that standard, we grant relief : 
in this case only if the Commission's facts are 
not supported bv substantial evidence when ' 
viewed in the light of the whole record, §63-
46b-!o(4)(g), or that the Commission erron- j 
eously interpreted or applied the law, §63- j 
46b-16(4)(d). See, generally Monon Int'J v. 1 
Utah State Tax Comrn'n, 163 Utah Adv. Rep. , 
34 (1991 j (discussing standard of review under ; 
APA). 
The County first contends that the propejly 
is not "land which is actively devoted to agri- , 
cultural use" as required by >ection 59-5-8? | 
because Bell Mountain is a real estate devel-
oper and its agricultural activity on this land is « 
nominal at best. The County in essence asks ' 
us 10 construe the term "actively devoted to j 
agricultural use" as requiring that land be I 
either farmed for profit or "primarily | 
devoted* to agricultural use. See Annotation, j 
Taxes- Treatment of Agricultural Land, 98 j 
A.L.R.3d 916 (1980), for cases supporting this I 
construction. We disposed of this issue in Salt 
Lake County" v. State Tax Commission, 779 j 
P.2d 1131 (Utah 19S9), where this court reje-1! 
cted the limited interpretation the County j 
attempts to place on the words "actively | 
devoted/ as the statute itself does not 
mandate, exclusive j or primary devotion te 
agricuTtVfra! use. Id. at 1132-33. 
In that case, the land in question was a 
buffer zone around a plant in which explosives : 
were manufactured. On the land, wheat was j 
raised and livestock grazed. We affirmed the j 
State Ta.x Commission's decision that the land j 
was actively devoted to agricultural use even ; 
though it also served an industrial use. Id. j 
Similarly, in the instant case, the fact that the 
land is held primarily for residential develop- | 
ment and that the grazing of cattle thereon is 
an incidental and secondary use does not dis- ' 
qualify the land from assessment under the ! 
F.A.A. so long as the acreage, income, and \ 
other requirements of section 59-5-89 are j 
met. The very purpose of the F.A.A. is to ; 
allow- land which has become valuable for a 
nonagricjltural u<e to be assessed as agricult-
ural land as long as agricultural activity is 
actually carried on and the minimum qualify 
ying requirements of ;he act are satisfied. See 
To*n>hip of Ando\er v. Kymer. 140 N.J. 
Super. 399. 356 A 2d -M8 (19"6) (the fact that 
an owner holds his '.and for resale does not 
disqualify H trom farmiano assessment j . 
One of the commissioners, in his dissent, 
pointed out the high cost to the taxpavers of 
affording F A.A status to large acreages of 
land ripe for re^der.tial development ^lmpiv 
bcau^e the acreage temporarily sUNtjins a few 
head o\ cattle. An> evil m thi^ regard cannot 
be corrected m this 'orum. Only the legislature, 
has the power to curb excesses which ma> be 
permuted bv the present statutory minimum 
qualifying requirements. 
The Countv next contends that the Comm-
ission erred bv granting F.A.A. >t3tus to the 
full 431.41 acres because Bell Mountain 
admitted that us cattle grazed on onl> about 
100 acres. The remainder of the acreage was 
not grazed because of its steepness and inac-
cessibility due to gullies and ravines. We noie 
at the outset that only land which is "used for 
agricultural purposes" is permitted by the 
Utah Constitution to be assessed at less than 
its fair market value. Article 13, section 3(2) 
provides: 
Land used for agricultural purposes 
may, as the Legislature prescribes, 
be assessed according to its value 
for agricultural use without regard 
to the value it may have for other 
purposes. 
In implementation of that constitutional 
provision, the legislature has defined "land in 
agricultural use" in Utah Code Ann. §59-5-
88 (now §59-2-502) as follows: 
Land shall be deemed to be in 
agricultural use when devoted to the 
raising of plants and animals useful 
to man including but not limited to: 
forages and sod crops; grains and 
feed crops; dairy animals, poultry, 
livestock, including beef cattle, 
sheep, swine, horses, ponies, mules 
or goats, including the breeding or 
grazing of any or all of such 
animals .... 
In Township of Ando\er v. Kymer. 140 N.J. 
Super. 399, 356 A.2d 418 (1976), the court 
was confronted with whether to grant farm-
land assessment status to a 210-acre farm of 
which only between 41 and 100 acres were 
actually under cultivation. It did not appear 
that any part of the land was used for the 
grazing of animals. The township tax assessor 
refused to assess as farmland the acreage that 
was wooded or swampy or consisted of rocky 
terrain with no evidence of cultivation. The 
court held that the woody, swamps, rocky 
acreage with a marginal value for agricultural 
or horticultural jse may be given the special 
farmland ta_x treatment as long as those areas 
an a "part of. appurtenant to. or reasonably 
required for the purpose of maintaining :he 
land actually devoted to farming use. partic-
ularly where it has been part of the farm for a 
I TAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
number ot vears " 140 N J Super at 4(H 3<6 
A 2d at 420 In holdine thai ihe assessor 
should have given the special farmland tax 
treatment to he enure tract the court while 
acknowledging that the primary goal ot he 
legislation was to save 'he familv farm and to 
provide farmers Aith some economic rehet bv 
permittinc their lands to be taxed ai a lower 
assessment also stated hat another objec ive 
was to encourage the maintenance and pre^e 
rvation of open space and beautv of the cou 
ntrvside 140 N J Super at 404 ^ 6 A 2d at 
420 
In contrast in blah farmland assessment 
can be extended to property onlv if it is in 
agricultural use Our constitution and statutes 
do not permit it for open spaces which may 
have aesthetic value Land to be given F A A 
status therefore must complv *uh the legisla 
tive definition of agricultural use in section <9 
5 88 set out above In so holding we reco 
gnize as did the New Jersey court that it 
would be a staggering undertaking" for the 
assessor to have to extract nonfertile areas 
from everv tract of farmland 140 N J Super 
at 404 05 3^6 A 2d at 420-21 The statute 
need not be applied as the law of the Viedes 
and the Persians We are aware that even on 
the best of farms there may be relatively small 
areas which are not strictly "devoted to the 
raising of plants and animals useful to man " 
\Ke aKo acknowledge that nonproductive areas 
sometimes mav be reasonably required for the 
purpose of maintaining the land actually 
devoted to production A certain amount of 
liberality must be indulged in if the legislative 
purpose and common sense are to prevail 
However, in the instant case, it appears that 
as much as "5 percent of the acreage sought to 
be given preferential assessment is not grazed 
by the cattle or accessed by them for watering 
shelter or anv other purposes This acreage is 
not reasonablv required for the purpose of 
maintaining the land auuallv grazed nor does 
\i in anv wax support activity on that land 
Under these circumstances, it cannot be succ 
essfullv maintained that such acreage is in 
agricultural use* Furthermore* the seven sep-
arateh described tracts were not ever part of I 
unit farm as was the case in Township of 
Ando\er v k\mer For all that appears in the 
record the seven parcels mav have been acq 
uired bv the taxpa>er at different times and 
the onlv relationship between them is simplv 
that thev meet each other at one or more ot 
their corners We do not believe that it was 
the in em ot the constitutional authorization 
in art vie H sec ion 1(2) and of the implem 
ent n2 statutes that tracts not in actual agnc 
ultural use could be bootstrapped onto a core 
of aencultural property and therebv spread the 
preferent al tax assessment to a Aide area 
Finauv the Countv challenges the Commi 
ssion s findings that Bell Mountain obtained 
its income through an arm s length transa 
etion Property n \ regulation no 9 located in 
M 2 14 I \ d m nistration Regulations 
Farmland VscsMnem Act ot 1%^ provides 
j Cross n^omc Section 9 * 
0 1 ) and r )ss ales Section *9 N 
* 9 0 hill *oth De intcrpK cd o 
mean cms alts 
r> Ml sjk must be made at arms 
[sk] length in order to quality 
v. Income as required tor F A A 
qualitication under section 9^ ^ 
8"* shall be determined as being tax 
I reportable and will be substantiated 
bv appropriate income tax sched 
I ules 
Bell Mountain pays taxes on an accrual 
| basis It recorded the income here at issue as 
i earned in September 1985, though payment 
I was not received until January of the folio 
' wing vear The income from the cut and 
wrapped meat sold to two shareholders ol 
Bel' Mountain, was shown as Si 000 Another 
$1 4H 99 was received in 1986 There was 
substantial evidence in the record that the 
| prices paid bv the two shareholders were at or 
, near live market prices published bv the Dep 
artment of Agriculture for the same period tor 
1
 slaughter steers in the same weight range The 
I evidence was also uncontroverted that receipts 
j and checks produced reflected the sales that 
the shareholders and Bell Mountain were 
I separate entities at all times and that the 
income had been reported on Bell Mountain s 
tax returns Therefore there is no error in the 
Commission's finding that the sales were 
arm s length transactions 
| The decision of the Commission is reversed 
and the case is remanded to the Commission 
. for the purpose of granting F A A status to 
j only that part of the acreage which is in agn 
cultural use as explained in this opinion 
WE CONCLR 
Gordon R Hall Chief Justice 
1 Daniel Stewart Justice 
1 In 98" ihe ecislature ecoditicd the Act jnder 
Ltah Code Ann §<9 2 >0l <198") and renamed 
a (he Farmland A >o mem Aet None of ihe u^bs 
(anme provisions here at issue ha\e been v.han*ed 
bui we e er to the 1969 Ad lor ^hronoloe»«.al a*.*. 
urawV 
ZIWMERWAS, Justice (Concurring and 
Dissenting) 
I join Justice Howe s opinion except 'hat 
port on apparent!) holding that the State TaA 
Commission did not properly determine That 
all ot the land in question was devoted iO 
dgriculiu al purpose^ F rsi the Commission 
eon>idered rhe facts and determined that the 
land was eligible for the exemption including 
the par< of the parcels that were too steep 
and sullied for the cattle to graze upon 
ITAH \ D \ XNCE RLPORTS 
justice Howe's opinion reverses this essenti-
ally factual determination without explaining, 
other than in the most general way, how the 
record evidence fails to supper the Commis-
«o*'< conclusion 
Second e\en il the legal standard applied 
bv the Commission to determine whe'her land 
ib "devoted 'o" agricultural purpose- *as 
incorrect, as Justice Howe s opinion >uggests, 
the court toduv has not explained to the 
Commission or ro the bar A hat the proper 
standard is Some language in the opinion can 
be read to suggest that the exemption is. to be 
denied onlv with respev to those tracts of 
which no part is phvsicallv used for agricult-
ural purposes However, other language sug-
gests that the exemption is not available tor 
an\ portion of a parcel "not in actual agricu-
ltural use 
11 the former standard is the appropriate 
test, then 1 assume the Commission can 
administer the law without much difficultv 
(assuming that we explain to them in some 
greater detail how to determine, as the majo-
rity has apparentlv done in this case, when 
land is "devoted to ' raising livestock and how 
to determine whether "nonproductive areas 
[are] reasonablv required for the purpose of 
maintaining the land actually devoted to pro-
duction") But if the Commission must deduct 
from every parcel of land otherwise eligible 
for the exemption the acreage that is not either 
devoted to agriculture or a nonproductive area 
reasonablv required for the maintaining of 
land so devoted, then we have created preci-
sely the "staggering undertaking" for the ass-
essor warned against by the New Jersey court 
in Township of Ando^cr v Kymer, 140 N J. 
Super 399, 404-05, 356 A 2d 418, 420 
(1976) It is no answer to say blithely that the 
statute "need not be applied as the law of the 
Medes and the Persians." That will hardly be 
helpful guidance to the Commission The 
Commission must apply, the law as we cons-
true it By our construction, we act as the 
Medes and the Persians, and we have created 
an absurdly unadministerable law 
Durham, Justice, concurs with the 
concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice 
Zimmerman. 
Cie as 
170 Ltah Kdy. Rep. 16 
IN T H E S I P R E M E C O l RT 
OF T H E S T A T E OF I T A H 
STXTP of Ltah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee. 
Steven Trov SPAN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 890152 
FILFD: September 30, 1991 
Third District, Salt Lake Countv 
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup 
ATTORNEYS 
R Paul Van Dam, David B Thompson, Salt 
Lake Citv for appellee 
Brooke C Wells. Elizabeth Holbrook, Salt 
Lake Citv tor appellant 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
STEWART. Justice: 
Steven Troy Span appeals his conviction ot 
one count of aggravated arson, a first degree 
, felony Span claims the evidence was tnsuffi-
, cient to support the conviction, the prosecutor 
1
 deliberately introduced evidence which had 
I been excluded by the trial court, and the 
1
 prosecutor improperly used a peremptory 
, challenge to remove a potential juror from the 
| venire because of the juror's race 
J I. FACTS 
I Sometime between 3 15 and 3 20 a m on 
November 16, 1988, Brent Van Os and Curt 
' Taylor drove past an apartment complex 
loca'ed at 2800 South Adams Street m Salt 
Lake and noticed a fire in a second story 
apartment of the complex After Van Os and 
Taylor checked the affected apartment to 
i determine if it was unoccupied 3nd knocked 
on doors to warn other residents. Van Os 
called the Tire department at 3 32 a m The 
South Salt Lake Fire Department arrived 
within five minutes and quickly extinguished 
' the blaze David Meldrum, who investigated 
j the fire with a team of arson experts, estim-
!
 ated that the fire had burned in a single apa-
, rtment for approximately fifteen or twentv 
j minutes before the fire department arrived 
Meldrum concluded that the fire had been 
intentionallv set He based his conclusion on 
the mtensitv of the fire, the burn pattern of 
1
 the fire, the presence in the apartment of a 
1
 puneent odor hours after the fire, which ind-
i icated the use of an accelerant, and other 
!
 peculiar factors Meldrum excluded the poss-
ibihtv that the fire was accidental 
LT\H AD\ KSCL RLPORTS 
